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* 
 
We examine the relationship of child gender with family and economic outcomes using a 
large dataset from the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey (PHBS) for years 2003-2009. Apart 
from studying the effects of gender on family stability, fertility and mothers’ labor market 
outcomes, we take advantage of the PHBS’ detailed expenditure module to examine effects 
of gender on consumption patterns. We find that a first born daughter is significantly less 
likely to be living with her father compared to a first born son and that the probability of 
having the second child is negatively correlated with a first born daughter. Using the context 
of the collective model we provide interpretation of these results from the perspective of 
individual parental gender preferences. We also examine the potential effects of sample 
selection bias which may affect the results and may be important for other findings in the 
literature. Labor supply of mothers and overall child-related consumption is not affected by 
gender of the first child, but the pattern of expenditure significantly varies between those with 
first born sons and first born daughters. One possible interpretation of the findings is that 
Polish fathers have preferences for sons and Polish mothers have preferences for daughters. 
Expenditure patterns suggest potential early determination of gender roles – mommies’ girls 
get dresses and daddies’ boys get toys. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last decades we have seen diminishing degree of gender discrimination in many 
societies. Growing equality has been documented in many areas of public life (Orloff, 1993), 
in labor markets in general (Fortin, 2005) as well as in particular high-end jobs (Terjesen and 
Singh, 2008). Inequality with respect to gender, however, finds its expression also at the 
household level, and this type of reflection of gender driven outcomes has real and significant 
implications for the quality of life of both adults and children. One explanation of gender bias 
in this context is parents’ tastes for the gender of their children, evidence for which has 
recently been growing, and there has been a number of studies documenting its implications 
(e.g. Dahl and Moretti, 2008; Barcellos et al., 2010; Ichino et al. 2011).  
One key outcome related to children’s gender which has been examined in the literature is 
partnership stability. As pointed out by Dahl and Moretti (2008) the correlation between 
gender composition of children and family status is also consistent with alternative 
hypotheses under unbiased gender preferences. These include the “role model” consequences 
on the welfare of children or different costs of raising boys and girls (e.g. Rosenzwig and 
Schultz, 1982) which may result in parental separation. The evidence so far does not allow for 
a clear identification of the mechanism behind the observed outcomes, and as Dahl and 
Moretti (2008) point out, “more than one explanation could very well be at play”.  
The predominant interpretation of the findings in the literature has been that the outcomes 
relate to specific parental preferences of one gender over another. Such interpretation has 
been supported by direct evidence on parental preferences over gender of their children found 
in survey declarations concerning the gender of children.
2
The complexity of the issues involved is illustrated with reference to the collective model 
(Chiappori, 1992) which seems to be a natural context for the analysis of gender preferences 
and family outcomes. The outcomes we observe may well reflect “gender preferences”, but 
additional assumptions are necessary if we are to specify whose preferences are identified. 
The assumptions relate to the nature of the bargaining power of parents, their minimum 
 We argue however, that a direct 
interpretation of the correlation of family outcomes with kids’ gender requires numerous 
additional assumptions, in particular if one wants to consider preferences of both parents 
separately.  
                                                           
2 See for example Gallup Pools from 2000 and 2003 for the US in which individuals are directly asked what sort 
of gender and gender composition they prefer for their children. 3 
 
acceptable utility level in marriage, as well as attitude to risk when a decision to have the next 
child is involved.  
Behavioral patterns conditional on the gender of children may affect fertility and may lead to 
important consequences, including economic ones, like labor market activity or changes in 
consumption behavior (Behrman, 1988; Barro and Becker, 1989). Boy preferences have been 
linked to discriminatory childcare investment behavior towards daughters (Barcellos et al., 
2010) or marriage instability (Dahl and Moretti, 2008). On the other hand, they may lead to 
increased labor supply of mothers (Chun and Oh, 2002) as well as fathers (Lundberg and 
Rose, 2002). Children’s gender seems to affect also such outcomes as parents’ voting 
behavior (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2010). Additionally, in its extreme expression, strong boy 
preferences may lead to an imbalance in the country’s sex ratio (Sen, 1990) through large 
scale sex-selective abortion and infanticide (Jha et al., 2006). 
Thus, it seems important from both the economic and sociological point of view to analyze 
and understand the relationship between children’s gender and various family outcomes both 
at country level as well as at the level of geographical and cultural areas. “Gender 
preferences” for children have been present in both the demographic (e.g. Cleland et al., 1983; 
Hank and Kohler, 2000; Andresson et al., 2006) and economic (e.g. Ben-Porath and Welch, 
1976; Dahl and Moretti, 2008; Ichino et al., 2011) research for a long time. The results point 
towards the fact that gender preferences for kids might yield conspicuous consequences not 
only for the particular households but also for the entire economy.  
Empirical studies testing for gender preferences examine them by analyzing the relationship 
between various household-level outcomes and exogenous gender variation such as the 
gender of the oldest child or children. The usual interpretation of such results is that it is 
parents’ preferences that are revealed in particular choices. The studies focus primarily on 
fertility data and fertility stopping rules but there is also growing literature on intra-household 
resource allocation and family stability. The common underlying framework assumes that if 
parents prefer boys to girls then the family will invest more resources and the parental 
relationship will be more stable once a boy rather than a girl is born to these parents. 
Assuming boy preferences, a couple with a girl as the first child is more likely to continue 
childbearing then a couple whose first born child is a boy. Parents with two girls are more 
likely to have a third child than those with two boys, other things being equal. Therefore, 
conditional on the number of boys (or girls) and the number of children, the transition 4 
 
probability of having an additional child given a fixed number of children is thus considered 
to be a simple fertility based test for gender preferences, but as we argue, on its own it is not 
sufficient for assigning gender preferences to any of the parents.  
It is also worth noting that if we combine the preferences for two boys and two girls in the 
same variable then we may be able to determine the preferences for mixed sex offspring given 
the increased probability of subsequent childbearing (Angrist  and Evans,  1998).
3
In this paper we investigate the relationship of children’s gender and important social and 
economic outcomes in Poland. To our knowledge this is the first study examining “gender 
preferences” using exogenous variation of first children’s gender done on data from Central 
and Eastern European countries. While Hank and Kohler (2000) provide an ordered probit 
analysis of sex preferences for 17 European countries (including Poland) using Fertility and 
Family Survey, their data come from the early 1990s and small sample sizes may be behind 
the fact that they find no evidence of gender preferences for many countries including Poland. 
Brockmann (2001) uses a hazard model to asses gender preferences in east and west Germany 
based on about 6000 observations from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
Interestingly from the point of view of our findings he concludes that east German women 
prefer girls, and finds no evidence for gender preferences in west Germany. It suggests that 
different institutional history and cultural background may affect parents’ gender preferences 
even within a single nation. A closer look at a country further to the east with a different 
social and cultural structure, like Poland, can in our view shed more light on the degree of 
variation in gender preferences between societies.  
  The 
literature, however, has so far not addressed the issue of which preferences are being reflected 
in the outcomes. Using the collective model’s framework we argue that jumping from 
correlations to conclusions on “preferences” may be too much of a simplification, although 
additional assumptions may make such interpretation justified.  
In this paper, using data from the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey for years 2003-2009 we 
try to shed light on gender preferences not only in the context of family structure and labor 
market outcomes of parents, but look also from the point of view of family expenditure 
patterns. Additionally the paper presents a methodological extension in the way that we test 
for the effect of sample selection in the analysis of gender preferences and fertility decisions.  
                                                           
3 For a formal theoretical model of gender preferences see Leung (1991). 5 
 
The main results indicate that in many aspects of life of Polish families there is evidence for 
differentiated behavior conditional on the gender  of children.. We find that there is a 
significant influence of the gender of the first-born child on marital stability. From the point 
of view of the collective model we outline in the Appendix these results, which are robust to a 
variety of specification tests, are consistent with fathers’ boy preferences, but could also 
reflect alternative interpretations. In contrast to previous research (for example: Ben-Porath 
and Welch, 1976; Khan and Sirageldin, 1977; Park, 1983; Das, 1987), however, we find only 
weak evidence for the relationship between children’s gender and fertility. Statistically 
significant effects of the gender of the first child on fertility are found only in the case of the 
probability to have the second child. Interestingly in this case we find that the probability of 
having the second child is higher if the first born is a boy. This seemingly contradicts our 
marital stability results but as we demonstrate, these results can be reconciled by correcting 
for sample selection out of marriage. The findings thus suggest that partnership stability and 
fertility increase if the first born is a boy. The usual interpretation of such findings would be 
that boy preferences drive partnership stability, while girl preferences determine fertility. Our 
approach, drawing on the collective model, suggests alternative interpretations.  
Further to this we find that unlike in the advanced economies there is no evidence of the 
effects of first born child’s gender on labor supply decisions of mothers in Poland through 
either direct or indirect channels. On the other hand gender of the first-born child significantly 
affects the pattern of household expenditure. While overall consumption on children’s goods 
does not depend on their gender, what parents buy differs depending on whether their first 
born child was a girl or a boy. Parents spend less (by about 11%) on toys and more (by about 
7%) on children’s clothing and shoes if the first born child is a girl. The effects of such 
differences on the quality of children’s lives is difficult to gauge, but it may reflect the early 
assignment of social roles and show parents’  preferences for specific types of early 
investment in their offspring. Girls are to look nice, boys are to play, and thus girls get 
dresses, boys get toys.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the fertility 
background and fertility developments in Poland over the last decades, and present the data 
we use in the estimation. In Section 3 we discuss our estimates showing the degree of gender 
preferences as expressed in marital stability and fertility. This is followed by studying indirect 
channels including fertility and labor supply decisions and household expenditure (Section 4). 6 
 
In Section 5 we examine the heterogeneity of our results by mothers’ education group and 
cohort, and we conclude in Section 6.  
2.  Institutions, data and descriptive statistics 
2.1 Fertility and sex-ratio at birth in Poland since 1950s 
Poland is the 6
th largest country by population and area in the European Union. It is also, to 
date, the largest and the most populous ex-communistic country that joined the EU. Prior to 
1990 Poland experienced several baby booms, with the number of births per year in the 1950s 
exceeding 700,000 and 600,000 in 1970s compared to 400,000 in 1990s or 370,000 in 2000s. 
The communistic governments generally promoted large families as the foundations of the 
economic success of the nation. This was expressed through availability of public childcare 
facilities, easier access to publicly allocated housing for families with children, and high 
employment return rates for mothers after maternity leave. Since the end of the 1980s, 
however, the fertility rate in Poland declined rapidly, resulting most probably from a 
combination of high economic instability as well as changing attitudes towards marriage and 
family formation. Importantly, however, gender parity at birth has always been close to 
natural, even during communism when the abortion laws were much more lenient than in the 
last two decades.
4
Figure 1. Population growth rate in Poland, 1950-2009 
 
 
Source: Population growth rate based on the Polish Central Statistical Office birth and population registry 
(www.stat.gov.pl).  
                                                           
4 Even under the regime the abortion laws in Poland were much stricter than in other communistic countries like 
Czechoslovakia or USSR. This might be attributed to a strong role of Roman Catholic Church during 
communism, which was one of the major forces uniting Polish society. 7 
 
Figure 1 presents the population growth rate in Poland since 1950s. In the early 2000s Poland 
experienced negative population growth, although this seems to have returned to positive 
values in the recent years. More importantly the ratio of boy to girl living births has been 
stable for the past 60 years with the minimum of 1.05 in 1994 and the maximum of 1.08 in 
1959 (Figure 2). The ratio has been stable around 1.06 since the early 1980s despite the 
advancement of early gender identification technology (ultra-sound became common in 
Poland in mid-1990s), and changes in abortion legislation introduced in 1993. This suggests 
that there is little evidence  for  sex-selective abortion in Poland, a phenomenon well-
documented in the case of several Asian societies where gender ratios at birth are as high as 
1.12 in India or 1.33 in China (Das Gupta, 2005; Hesketh et al., 2005). This type of reflection 
of gender preferences would of course affect the estimates which we present in Sections 3 and 
4. 
Figure 2. Live births gender ratio in Poland, 1950-2009 
 
Source: Boys to girls gender ratio at birth based on the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm). 
2.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
We use a dataset from the Polish Households’ Budgets Survey (PHBS) for years 2003 – 2009. 
It is a nationally representative dataset collected every year by the Central Statistical Office in 
Poland.
5
                                                           
5 For more information on the methodology used by the Polish Central Statistical Office see: Barlik and Siwiak 
(2011). The methodology is approved and monitored by the EUROSTAT. 
  The full data set includes information on 248 860 households and 749 160 
individuals over the period of seven years. The size of the sample of the survey differs across 
years with around 37,000 households sampled every year since 2005 and around 32 000 
households sampled before that, and is representative for the entire Polish population. Most of 8 
 
the analysis is performed on family level, where a family is defined as a single adult or a 
couple (married or cohabiting) with any dependent children which are matched on the basis of 
family relationship information in the survey. This approach implies that there may be more 
than one family in any particular household. 
The data contain no retrospective fertility information and parents can only be matched with 
the children that live with them in the surveyed household. Because of that we restrict our 
sample to women younger than 41 and propose two subsamples conditional on the age of the 
oldest child. First, as Dahl and Moretti (2008) we use cutoff at 12 years of age and secondly, 
following Ichino et al. (2011), we apply the 15 years cutoff. Because of the sample size 
restrictions we use the larger sample for our main analysis and the smaller one for robustness 
testing.
6
The descriptive statistics alongside the number of births in our samples are presented in Table 
1. The main sample consist of 56 578  observations (families) within which 48 493 
observations are families with married parents. The total sample restricted to the oldest child 
having at most 12 years old has 45 511 observations. The top panel of the table presents 
frequencies of families by the number of children. The bottom panel presents means and 
standard deviations of a selection of variables used in the analysis. Fertility indicators are 
naturally smaller in the sample with 12 year olds as these mothers are younger and thus more 
likely to have an incomplete fertility history. Importantly, however, the core dependent 
variables used in Dahl and Moretti (2008) do not differ much between the 15 and 12 years old 
  Following previous research we also exclude widowed mothers from the main 
analysis (about 3% of the overall sample). The sample also excludes lone fathers, i.e. families 
in which mothers do not live with their children in the household. Since paternal custody is 
extremely rare in Poland (below 4% of custody decisions) there are only 275 such cases in the 
dataset with the above child and parental age restrictions. Any gender-bias in these rare 
paternal custody decisions could not be confirmed (see footnote 7 for details). 
                                                           
6 Any resulting sample selection bias is likely to be very small since schooling in Poland is compulsory until the 
age of 18 and a large majority of children will live with their parents until at least that age. Additionally, Polish 
legislation strictly forbids employment of youths younger than 16 years old and allows it in limited amount for 
youths older than 16 years old conditional on post primary education. Since our sample selection limits the age 
of the mother at 40 there may also be selection bias resulting from the fact that some of these mothers may have 
kids who are no longer their dependent children, which would mean that we erroneously treat their second child 
as their first. Such cases will however be very rare, as they will apply only to mothers who: (a) had a child aged 
21 or less (40-21 = 19) (b) whose first child, aged 19+ is no longer in education and thus does not count as a 
dependent child, and (c) had a second child at least four years later (i.e. the second child is a dependent child and 
fulfills our sample criteria).  9 
 
cutoff samples. Moreover, the younger mothers are less likely to work or work for pay and 
have lower monthly labor income. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Number of births 
  All families  Married couples 
# children  Frequency  %  Frequency  % 
1  25 656  45.35  20 252  41.76 
2  22 490  39.75  20 551  42.38 
3  6 378  11.27  5 843  12.05 
4  1 412  2.50  1 283  2.65 
5  424  0.75  364  0.75 
6  151  0.27  135  0.28 
7  40  0.07  40  0.08 
8  21  0.04  19  0.04 
9  3  0.01  3  0.01 
10  1  0.00  1  0.00 
11  1  0.00  1  0.00 
12  1  0.00  1  0.00 
Observations  56,578  100  48,493  100 
Sample means on family level (standard deviations in brackets) 
  Oldest child at most 15 years old  Oldest child at most 12 years old 
# children ever born  1.749 (0.867)  1.618 (0.767) 
More than 1 child  0.537 (0.499)  0.473 (0.499) 
More than 2 children  0.146 (0.353)  0.104 (0.306) 
Girl first  0.486 (0.500)  0.484 (0.500) 
Girl second  0.266 (0.442)  0.234 (0.423) 
Two girls  0.131 (0.337)  0.114 (0.318) 
Two boys  0.148 (0.355)  0.131 (0.338) 
Age mother  31.07 (4.97)  29.90 (4.70) 
Age at first birth  23.49 (3.71)  23.88 (3.85) 
% living without a father  0.134 (0.341)  0.139 (0.346) 
% never married  0.073 (0.261)  0.085 (0.279) 
% separated or divorced  0.066 (0.248)  0.059 (0.236) 
% custody  0.999 (0.038)  0.999 (0.035) 
% married  0.857 (0.350)  0.852 (0.356) 
Mother works  0.612 (0.487)  0.588 (0.492) 
Mother works for pay  0.595 (0.491)  0.573 (0.495) 
Mother’s labor income  649.03 (979.66)  633.42 (988.17) 
Number of observations  56 578  45 511 
Notes: The samples include families in which the mother is younger than 40 with at least one child in the family. 
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the PHBS data (2003-2009).  
3.  Family outcomes in the context of gender preferences 
3.1 Gender preferences and family stability 
The first part of the analysis focuses on the examination of the model proposed by Dahl and 
Moretti (2008) in which we test if child gender affects family structure. We analyze three 
binomial family outcomes defined by the marital position of the mother:  
-  whether the child (children) currently lives without a father; 
-  whether the mother never marries (has always been single); 10 
 
-  whether the mother is currently separated or divorced.  
We thus estimate the following model: 
 
'' '
1 12 23 (First child girl )
j
i i i ii Y XX α α αε =+++   (1) 
where Yi
j represents the indicator variable j for living without a father, mother being never 
married and mother being separated or divorced; X1 contains mothers’ socio demographic 
variables (mother’s age polynomial, mother’s age at first birth, and education dummies); X2 
includes five dummies for town size, regional controls for sixteen voivoidships and time 
dummies.  
Significant coefficients on the “first born girl” variable has usually been considered in the 
literature as a reflection of the parents’ gender preferences through its negative effect on the 
stability of parental partnerships. The sign of the coefficient will reflect either positive or 
negative influence of the first child being a girl. Interpreting these as reflections of 
preferences requires some caution, however. In the collective model’s setting which we 
outline in the Appendix we show that, the crucial assumption that is needed concerns the 
minimum  level of utility required in marriage by either of the partners to stay in the 
partnership. A significant estimate of the coefficient on “first born girl” is consistent with 
boy preferences of both partners, a boy preference of one combined with gender neutrality of 
the other as well as with opposite gender preferences of the parents. Whose preferences are 
“identified” will depend on the assumptions one is prepared to make concerning the 
acceptable minimum levels of utility in marriage. The identification relies also on the 
assumption that children’s gender does not affect the relative bargaining power of the parents. 
Such effect of course cannot be completely ruled out and it is possible that it could also 
generate the observed correlations. If this was the case then the results of the estimations 
could not be given a “preference” interpretation as bargaining power is distinct from 
individual preferences. 
7
                                                           
7 Since in the analysis we are looking only at children living with their mothers one potential source of bias in 
the estimations could be gender biased custody decisions. In the Polish case this is an unlikely source of bias. In 
almost all cases of custody decisions in Poland custody is given to the mother. For example custodies were given 
to the father only in 3.6% cases in 2003 and in 3.9% in 2009. In addition to this using the PHBS data on all lone 
parents (mothers and fathers) we examined if there is any relationship between paternal or maternal custody and 
gender of the first child. The coefficient on the first child being a girl in this estimation is 0.00141 (p-value: 
0.254) which we take as evidence that even in these limited number of cases of paternal custody there is no 
gender-bias in the decisions.  
  11 
 
In Table 2 we present regression results for the model specified in equation (1) for the three 
dependent variables. All families in the sample are included in regressions where we examine 
the probability of living without a father or of mother never being married (columns 1 and 2 
in Table 2), while in the case of looking at the probability of divorce or separation (column 3) 
we restrict the sample only to mothers which have ever been married.  
Table 2. First child gender and the family status 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Living without father  Mother never married  Mother separated or divorced 
First child a girl  0.01044***  0.00628***  0.00483** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
First boy baseline  0.1291525  0.0702493  0.0634144 
Percent effect  8.1  8.9  7.6 
Observations  56,578  56,578  52,421 
R-squared  0.080  0.122  0.029 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
Families with children living at home aged between 0 and 15, mothers aged <41.  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 
The results show that even in a sample which is much smaller in comparison to earlier studies 
(e.g. Dahland Moretti, 2008), we can confirm strong and statistically significant influence of 
the gender of the first born child on the family structure. A first born girl increases the 
probability of the children living without a father, the mother never marrying as well as the 
probability of divorce or separation. The coefficient in column (1) indicates that families in 
which the first born child is a girl are about one percentage point more likely to live without a 
father than families in which the first born child is a boy. This estimate provides the total 
effect on the probability of living without the father when the first born child is a girl versus a 
boy,  including all the possible indirect effects that operate through subsequent fertility 
choices. The point estimate is much larger than in Dahl and Moretti (2008). To be able to 
compare the results across papers we also report the first boy baseline, a measure of the 
fraction of first born boy families without a resident father. Since we control for a number of 
characteristics of the mother and of the family, the first born baseline is calculated as the 
average predicated probability of having a non-resident father for first born boy families using 
the estimated coefficients on the control variables.  
The percent effect, which is the odds ratio minus 1, reported in column (1) indicates that the 
probability of living without a father increases by 8.1% when comparing a family whose first 
child was a boy to a family whose first child was a girl. The effect for the sample with 
children aged 0-12 is 6.1% (Table A1), which is almost twice as high as the effect found in 12 
 
Dahl and Moretti (2008), which was noted by the authors as a “surprisingly large effect”. The 
probability of the mother never marrying (column 2) is also higher if the first born child is a 
girl, with a statistically significant effect and the percent effect of 8.9%. Column (3) of Table 
2 reports the estimated coefficients when the divorce and separation dummy is regressed on 
the gender of the first child. This estimate is not affected by the endogeneity of family size as 
it provides the total effect on divorce of having a girl versus a boy as the first child, including 
any indirect effects that operate through differences in the subsequent fertility, gender birth 
order, or gender mix. The estimate shows that parents whose first child is a girl are 0.48 
percentage points more likely to be divorced than those whose first child is a boy. The percent 
effect implies that the probability of divorce when moving from a family whose first child 
was a boy to a family whose first child was a girl increases by 7.6%. The effect estimated on 
the 0-12 sample - 2.4% (Table A1), which is again twice as high as the results presented in 
Dahl and Moretti (2008), but in our case, due to a smaller sample size, is not statistically 
significant. It is interesting to note the differences between the samples conditional on the age 
of the oldest child (0-15 or 0-12). It may indicate that a decision to separate or divorce is 
delayed beyond a certain age of the oldest child.  
In Table A2 in the Appendix we also report results for a model extended to include controls 
for the gender of the first two children – whether the first two were girls or boys. These 
estimations are conducted on a sample with at least two children, which will naturally imply 
an endogeneity bias if marital/partnership status determine fertility. We estimate several 
specifications including and excluding the gender of the first child, as well as looking at the 
effect of mixed gender of the first two children. The results generally support the findings 
presented in Table 2, though the magnitude of the effects differs depending on the 
specification. The magnitude of the effect of having first two girls on separation or divorce is 
substantial - we find 1.1 percentage point effect for having two daughters first, i.e. 20.8% of 
the baseline two-boy divorce rate. When we turn to families with a mixed sex composition we 
actually find a negative and significant effect of 11%. This is in line with Angrist and Evans 
(1998) and Chun and Oh (2002), who argue in favour of mixed sex gender preferences in 
childbearing decisions at higher parities. Additionally, in the final panel of Table A2 we also 
present robustness checks for families in which the age of the oldest child is restricted to 
being greater than 4 (i.e. between 5 and 15) to control for the potential bias resulting from 
incomplete fertility histories. These results are not substantially different from those presented 
in Table 2.  13 
 
For a more direct comparison with Ichino et al. (2011) the Appendix contains also estimates 
of probabilities of the mother being married (Table A3) estimated with the same controls for 
gender composition of children as the results in Tables A2 and for the four samples defined 
by the age of the oldest and youngest children. We find consistent coefficients on the first 
born girl across the samples with statistically significant negative effects of the first child 
being a girl, and a percentage effect of between 1.1 and 1.5 depending on the sample.  
3.2 Gender of the first-born child and implications for total fertility 
In the analysis above, we demonstrated evidence that in Poland boys increase the probability 
of families living with both parents either through higher probability of marriage or lower 
separation rates. At higher parities this effect might operate through mixed sex composition of 
children in the family. One of the consequences of lower marital stability in the case of first 
born girl may in turn be lower number of subsequent births and as a result lower total fertility. 
On the other hand, however, if there are boy preferences, a first born girl may imply higher 
fertility if the parents decide to have another child to have a desired son.  
To examine the issue of the effect of first child’s gender on fertility in more detail we estimate 
the following model: 
 
'' '
1 12 23 [or More than j children]=(First child girl) i i i ii C XX α α αε ++ +   (2) 
where X1 and X2 are defined as in equation (1) and Ci is the number of children in the family, 
while More than j children is the indicator variable of the j
th parity progression ratio. 
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 3. The first panel of the table documents 
the relationship between the number of children in the family and the gender of the first child. 
In the sample of all women (column 1) a first born girl has a statistically significant negative 
effect  on the number of children in the family. For married women (column 2) while 
insignificant, the coefficient is also negative. We need to remember though that fertility 
effects operate, at least partially, through family stability. Thus, if there are boy preferences 
reflected in the probability of parents being together, then total fertility may be reduced as a 
result of the implied instability. This is confirmed in additional specifications where we run 
the model on all families but with controls for being married (columns 3 and 4) and an 
interaction of being married with first born girl (column 4). In both cases the coefficient on 
the married dummy is positive and highly significant. The coefficients on first born girl and 14 
 
its interaction with marriage are insignificant, yet the effect of first born girl is still negative 
for both married and non-married mothers.  
Table 3. Effects of first child’s gender on fertility 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  All  Married  Marriage control  Marriage interaction 
Total number of children 
First child a girl  -0.01049*  -0.00780  -0.00743  -0.00901 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.015) 
Married mother      0.24661***  0.24569*** 
      (0.009)  (0.012) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.00183 
        (0.017) 
Observations  56,578  48,493  56,578  56,578 
R-squared  0.293  0.297  0.302  0.302 
Probability of having two or more children 
First child a girl  -0.01267***  -0.01333***  -0.01029***  0.00454 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Married mother      0.19152***  0.20020*** 
      (0.005)  (0.007) 
First child a girl * Married mother        -0.01730* 
        (0.010) 
Observations  56,578  48,493  56,578  56,578 
R-squared  0.283  0.287  0.299  0.299 
Probability of having three or more children 
First child a girl  0.00164  0.00349  0.00217  -0.00618 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Married mother      0.04321***  0.03832*** 
      (0.004)  (0.005) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.00975 
        (0.007) 
Observations  56,578  48,493  56,578  56,578 
R-squared  0.155  0.155  0.157  0.157 
Probability of having four or more children 
First child a girl  0.00051  0.00157  0.00060  -0.00507 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Married mother      0.00733***  0.00401 
      (0.002)  (0.003) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.00661* 
        (0.004) 
Observations  56,578  48,493  56,578  56,578 
R-squared  0.063  0.065  0.064  0.064 
Probability of having five or more children 
First child a girl  -0.00037  -0.00021  -0.00036  -0.00120 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Married mother      0.00126  0.00077 
      (0.001)  (0.002) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.00098 
        (0.002) 
Observations  56,578  48,493  56,578  56,578 
R-squared  0.029  0.029  0.029  0.029 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Families with children living at 
home aged between 0 and 15, mothers aged <41.  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 
What is even more interesting is the fact that when we look at the second panel in which we 
present probability estimates of having two or more children the coefficients on first born girl 15 
 
is negative in columns (1)-(3), while in column (4) where we interact it also with the married 
dummy, the effect of first born girl for married mothers is negative and significant, while it is 
positive (though insignificant) for the non-married. The negative coefficients on first born 
girl, at first seem to contradict the findings we presented in Section 3.1. While under the 
condition we specify, lower family stability following a first born girl  suggest boy 
preferences (at least of one of the parents), the usual reading of the negative coefficient on 
first born girl in fertility equations would point towards girl preferences. As we show below, a 
more careful analysis (Table 4) first of all demonstrates that such contradictory results may 
result from a sample selection bias. Secondly, we argue that in the collective model’s 
framework in which individual preferences of parents are considered under certain conditions 
the negative fertility effect of first born girl may in fact be consistent with boy preferences of 
one of the partners.
8
Table 4. Probability of two or more children under alternative assumptions of 
preferences of separated parents 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  All separated parents have 
boy preferences 
All separated 
parents have girl 
preferences 
Separated parents 
have either boy or 
girl preferences 
First child a girl  0.02020***  -0.04471***  -0.01314*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
First boy baseline  0.5524072  0.5850391  0.5854044 
Percent effect  3.7  -7.6  -2.2 
Observations  56,578  56,578  56,578 
R-squared  0.248  0.247  0.224 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Families with children living at 
home aged between 0 and 15; mothers aged <41.  
Imputations of children for separated families adjusted for the probability of having more than one child  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 
The reason for the potential selection bias in the fertility estimations of the coefficient on first 
born girl is the fact that unlike in the case of married parents, for non-married mothers, if their 
fertility is affected by the separation, we do not observe their child preference as reflected in 
the number of children conditional on the gender of the first. To examine the potential extent 
of this bias, we estimate the role of gender of the first child with assumed gender preferences 
                                                           
8 We need to note here that although we can observe the current marital status we do not observe the entire 
partnership history. This is a problem also common to other studies in the literature. For example it is possible 
that some of those women have been previously divorced. This may be problematic as women whose first child 
is a girl are more likely to get divorce and fertility of divorced women is generally lower. Thus, the relationship 
between child gender and fertility are biased towards finding a negative relationship between the first born girl 
indicator and fertility. In our case the coefficients for the married and the total sample are similar so the bias 
should not be too severe. We believe that this bias is indeed unlikely to be problematic as according to Central 
Statistical Office data only around 7.7% of divorced women (including those with and without kids) remarried in 
the years 2003 – 2009. 16 
 
of parents who are no longer living together.
9
First we assume that all parents who no longer live together have “boy preferences”, i.e. we 
assume that parents with the first born girl would have had another child had they stayed 
together (column 1). This is done by “imputing” another child to those separated parents who 
had a first born girl. Further we assume that all separated parents have “girl preferences”, i.e. 
that those with a first born boy would have another child had they not separated (column 2). 
Finally, we assume that separated parents with a first born girl have “boy preferences”, and 
those with a first born boy have “girl preferences”. The latter case implies “imputing” an 
additional child to all separated parents (column 3).
 Table 4 presents the estimates of the effect of 
first born girl  on the probability of having two or more children under such different 
assumptions. In the case of this exercise it is not relevant whose preferences are being 
assumed – mother’s or father’s – since it is the overall outcome of these preferences which is 
identified in the regression. 
10 In all three cases the imputation is 
adjusted by the probability of having another child, i.e. only those parents with higher than 
average probability of having another child (estimated on the sample of non-separated 
parents) are imputed an additional child.
11
Results of the estimations using data with these imputed additional children adjusted by 
probability of having another child are presented in Table 4. They confirm the important role 
of the potential sample selection bias, and demonstrate that the negative effect of gender of 
the first child may turn positive (and statistically significant) under the assumption that all 
separated parents had “boy preferences”, i.e. would have had another child if the first born 
was a girl (column 1). The assumption that generates these results is arguably very strong, and 
under the more natural one (column 3) the estimated coefficients still suggest overall 
“preferences” in favor of girls
  
12
                                                           
9 We are extremely grateful to Björn Öckert for this suggestion.  
. However, the exercise suggests that the seemingly 
contradictory conclusions we reach may just reflect revealed preferences of different types of 
10 Note that the standard approach taken in other studies, and estimated above (panel 1 of Table 3) also makes an 
assumption on preferences of separated parents, namely that parents of first born girls have girls preferences, and 
those of first born boys have boy preferences.  
11 Details of these estimations are available from the authors.  
12 In fact when we assume that 20% of those from the sample of “all separated parents have boy preferences” 
would have girl preferences then we no longer obtain positive and significant coefficient. Furthermore, if we 
assume that 35% of those parents have girl preferences then it yields negative and significant coefficient. Thus, 
we believe that in the fertility analysis when correcting for selection bias we can, under reasonable assumptions, 




From the point of view of the above discussion is it interesting to note that according to a 
survey conducted in 2001, both men and women in Poland reveal child gender preferences 
biased in favor of their own gender.
 Several alternative explanations are also possible. For example if women assign a 
high value to partnership stability, then in the case of boy preferences of men and with the 
first born girl, they may decide not to have another child if the expectation is that a second girl 
would further increase the probability of partnership break up. In such a case men’s boy 
preferences reduce fertility in response to a first born girl regardless of the women’s gender 
preferences (see the discussion in the Appendix for an illustration).  
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4.  Labor supply and expenditure in the context of gender preferences 
 When asked about the preferred gender facing the 
possibility of having only one child, 56% Poles stated that the gender would not matter at all, 
22% preferred boys and 19% preferred girls, only 3% were undecided. Like in many 
advanced economies, males in Poland would prefer to have male offspring (32%) rather than 
female offspring (11%). However, in contrast to the data for these countries Polish women are 
also characterized with gender discriminatory preferences - Polish mothers prefer to have girls 
(27%) rather than boys (11%). These declared preferences are in line with the interpretation of 
our findings above. The results are consistent with the fact that men prefer boys and women 
have a preference for girls, though as we pointed out under certain conditions in the light of 
the collective model men’s preference for boys would be sufficient to generate the observed 
effects.  
In this section the analysis focuses on economic outcomes in relation to the gender of 
children. First we follow some earlier papers which examined the effect of children’s gender 
to mothers’ labor market outcomes including employment and labor market earnings. 
Secondly, we examine the relationship of the gender of children on household expenditure. 
This we find to be an important extension of the literature, as so far any evidence on this 
relationship comes only form developing countries. For analysis of expenditure we use the 
detailed module of the PHBS and identify child-related items to examine the extent to which 
allocation of expenditure differs by the gender of children. In this context we discuss the 
                                                           
13 Similar results – with even stronger effects of the assumed preferences – have been estimated on the sample of 
families with children aged 0-12. See Table A5 for details.  
14 The details can be found under the following URL: http://www.tnsglobal.pl/archive-report/id/447. The poll 
was conducted by TNS OBOP between 27
th and 29
th of January 2001 on countrywide, random and representative 
sample of 1096 individuals who where over 15 years old. The maximal statistical measurement error for this 
sample is estimated at the level +/- 3% with 95% confidence interval.  18 
 
possible underlying processes that may lead to the observed outcomes. We believe that 
uncovering these empirical relationships is important on the one hand from the point of view 
of understanding the nature of the labor market, and on the other from the point of view of 
gender policy and social roles assigned to men and women in the Polish society.  
4.1 Gender of the first-born child and mothers’ labor supply.  
The underlying econometric model we estimate in this section focuses on labor market 
outcomes of the mother and takes the following form: 
 
'' '
1 12 23 Work [or Work for pay  or Labor income ] (First child girl ) i i i i i ii XX α α αε =+++   (4) 
where Work is an indicator variable if the mother is currently employed; Work for pay is an 
indicator variable if she is currently employed and obtains monetary compensation for her 
work, while Labor income is the value of the monetary compensation from work. The other 
variables are defined as in equation (1). Results of the estimations are presented in Table 5. 
The sample focuses on the one hand on non-widowed families (columns 1-3) and on the other 
hand examines families headed by widows (4-5). We estimate the model separately 
conditional on the age of oldest child. Column (1) reports results of model (4) estimated using 
the sample of non-widowed women whose oldest child is no more than 15 years old. Unlike 
Ichino et al. (2011) we do not find any evidence that gender of first-born child affects 
significantly any of the labor market outcomes. Even considering the size of the coefficients 
the effects would be relatively small. The effect is still insignificant and even smaller if we 
focus on married couples only (Table A7 in the Appendix). Restricting the age of the oldest 
child to the bandwidth used by Dahl and Moretti (2008) does not alter the picture (column (2) 
in Tables 5 and A7). Thus, in the case of Poland unlike in the advanced economies studied by 
Ichino et al. (2011) we reject the hypothesis that the sex of the first born child matters for the 
labor supply of mothers through indirect channels noted in Dahl and Moretti (2008) i.e. 
marital stability and increased fertility. 
Columns (3)-(5) in Table 5 and column (3) in Table A5 explore the direct channel in which 
the gender of the first child might affect labor supply independent of fertility and marital 
stability. First, following Ichino et al. (2011) we study a sample of mothers whose first child 
is no more than two years old. Arguably in this case the majority of the women decide not to 
have another child, at least temporarily. We also analyze a sample of widowed mothers whose 
marriage ended through an exogenous shock. We do not find any significant effects for the 19 
 
sample of women with kids aged 0–2. The estimated coefficients are positive on the intensive 
margin and negative on the extensive margin for both full sample of women and for married 
women. Furthermore, they do not differ much quantitatively in terms of percent effect 
between these samples. We note that the coefficients are small and insignificant and one could 
conclude that there is indeed no effect of child gender on “fresh” mother’s labor supply.  
Table 5. Effect of first child’s gender on mother’s labor supply 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  All families  Widows 
VARIABLES  0-15  0-12  0-2  0-15  0-12 
Probability of working 
First child a girl  0.00510  0.00076  0.00407  0.02807  -0.04518 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.047)  (0.066) 
First boy baseline  0.6090687  0.587888  0.4543179  0.6227671  0.6205053 
Percent effect  0.8  0.1  0.9  4.5  -7.3 
Observations  56,578  45,511  10,614  450  266 
R-squared  0.142  0.144  0.164  0.164  0.185 
Probability of working for pay 
First child a girl  0.00344  -0.00010  0.00405  -0.01498  -0.11342* 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.048)  (0.066) 
First boy baseline  0.5933139  0.5728129  0.4367084  0.5668244  0.5984888 
Percent effect  0.6  -0.02  0.9  -2.6  -19.0 
Observations  56,578  45,511  10,614  450  266 
R-squared  0.140  0.143  0.165  0.178  0.190 
Monthly labor income 
First child a girl  -4.03431  -10.43508  -4.94694  -15.90319  -37.55947 
  (7.011)  (7.896)  (18.387)  (58.928)  (76.913) 
First boy baseline  650.9869  638.4631  518.8338  580.7095  614.3466 
Percent effect  -0.6  -1.6  -1.0  -2.7  -6.1 
Observations  56,578  45,511  10,614  450  266 
R-squared  0.278  0.276  0.224  0.347  0.374 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Samples conditional on the age 
of oldest child; mothers aged <41; separately for not widowed and widowed families.  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 
When we turn to the analysis of widows we also do not find any sizeable effects. The only 
significant coefficient is obtained for the sample of kids aged 0-12 and the probability of 
working for pay. It actually indicates that first-born girl rather than boy diminishes the 
mother’s labor supply on the extensive margin. The effect is very large at the level of 19%, 
which we find rather implausible. For example Ichino et al. (2011) find an negative effect of 
1.6% for boys. Given that we have 450 and 266 widows in the samples of 0-15 and 0-12 
respectively we treat these estimates as rather less informative than these of mothers with kids 
age 0–2. In order to obtain more reliable estimates of widowhood we use the whole sample 
and the interaction term of widowhood and girl as first–born child. The results are presented 20 
 
in Table A8 in the Appendix. We do not find any significant effects of either first born girl or 
the interaction term on any of the labor market outcomes measures. Thus, it assures us that the 
barely significant negative coefficient from column (5) in Table 5 may be an artifact of low 
power of the widows sample. It is also worth noting that the probability of working for pay is 
reduced by 6.5 percentage points among widows in households where the oldest child is not 
older than 15 years old. 
The combination of evidence presented above indicates that there is likely no direct or 
indirect effect of gender of the first born child on labor market outcomes of the mother. In 
Poland, like in the other countries, boys have higher incidence of congenital and non-
congenital diseases as well as higher mortality in early childhood. In our sample we do not 
have, however, any health status indicators and thus although we note that such a channel 
might be presents, we are unable to credibly asses it.
15
4.2 Gender of the first-born child and household expenditure  
 
Research on gender discrimination in inputs dates back to the seminal papers by Behrman et 
al (1986) and Behrman (1988). In the former the authors develop a theoretical model and find 
that there is no empirical evidence for the US supporting the hypothesis that parental 
preferences favor boys. Instead their analysis indicates that parental preferences exhibit either 
equal concerns or slightly favor girls. Behrman (1988) finds that in India there are indeed pro-
male preferences that manifest themselves especially during the lean season when the food is 
scarce. This picture points towards the fact that so long as resources are not limited there is no 
particular gender discrimination, however, when the household faces a shock to its budget it 
indeed invests more resources in (arguably more physically productive) male offspring. 
The Polish Household Budgets’ Survey contains detailed expenditure information of 
households collected over a period of a month. It includes details on over 400 specific 
consumption items and additionally separates spending on such items as shoes and clothing 
into adult (13+ years old) and child (<13) expenditures. On top of that we can identify such 
items as toys (the item is labeled as: “games, toys, hobby”), “education related books” (this 
does not include other books which are recorded separately), children’s holidays and trips (the 
item is called “organized tourism for children”), as  well as kindergarten and education 
                                                           
15 Infant mortality is generally higher for boys than for girls. In 2009 the infant mortality sex ratio defined as 
deaths of boys to girls aged zero to four in Poland was 1.26. For further details see:  
http://demografia.stat.gov.pl/bazademografia/Tables.aspx. 21 
 
expenditures. In what follows the five categories are labeled respectively as: “clothing”, 
“toys”, “books”, “trips”, “kindergarten”, and “school education”. Since generally schooling is 
paid for by the state in Poland the last category will include such items as additional classes 
and tutoring. The analysis presented below considers expenditures separately in each of the 
categories as well as in the form of “total spending”, which adds up the five child-related 
categories together.  
The model we estimate in each case is:  
 
'' '
1 12 23 (First child girl )
j
i i i ii E XX α α αε =+++   (5) 
where Ei
j is the expenditure of household i in the group j and the remaining variables are 
defined as in equation (1). We restrict our attention to households where the oldest child is at 
most 12 years old and the mother is between 18-40 years old. The first restriction relates to 
the already mentioned splitting of clothing expenditure in the survey into adult/child 
expenses. Additionally, since consumption data is collected on household and not on family 
level, we restrict our analysis to households in which there is only one family with children so 
that all child expenses can be assigned to this family. Results, together with basic descriptive 
statistics on the expenditure items are presented in Table 6. 
The analysis is conducted on three separate subsamples: 
-  the entire sample of families, including married couples, and single mothers with kids 
(excluding widows, these are considered separately in robustness checks in the 
Appendix, Table A9); 
-  those who have never been married, who got divorced as well as widows; 
-  the sample of married couples; 
-  the sample of widows. 
Results of the estimation are presented in Table 6 for the total child-related expenditure 
(column 1) and the other specific items (2-7). Each  of the panels of Table 6 includes 
descriptive statistics indicating the mean expenditure split by gender of the first child for a 
given group of goods as well as the share of the households in the sample that record positive 
expenditure in this group. The difference row indicates the results of statistical difference 
mean test. First panel presents the results for all families in the sample, while the second 22 
 
focuses on the sample of married couples. Additionally in the Appendix in Table A9 we show 
estimates for an extended sample which includes also widow-headed families and the separate 
estimates for the widows’ sample. The focus on the latter serves to proxy a sample affected by 
an exogenous shock to resources to see if there is any evidence on differentiated consumption 
patterns by the gender of the first child in response to such a shock. Finally we also present 
analysis of effects of first child’s gender on consumption patterns split by the age of the oldest 
child (Table A10 in the Appendix). 
As Table 6 demonstrates we find several important effects in terms of how first child’s gender 
affect consumption. In particular there is no evidence on any differentiation of total child-
related spending by gender in the full sample as well as in the sample of married couples. This 
suggests that the overall level of resources spent on girls and on boys is about the same in 
Poland. On the other hand, we find large and statistically significant effects in terms of pattern 
of spending depending on gender of the first child. This can be seen in columns (2) and (3), 
which demonstrate the estimates of expenditure on “clothing” and “toys”. If the first born 
child is a girl parents spend 6.5% more on children’s clothing, while if it is a boy by 11% 
more on toys and games. Furthermore, the married couples seem to show a greater bias 
towards girls as in response to female offspring they spend even more on clothing. It is 
unclear how such a differentiation may affect the overall quality of children’s lives, but it can 
be interpreted as a reflection of potential early assignment to social role models. It can also be 
considered as a consequence of parental decisions concerning differential investment of 
resources in boys and girls. 
Importantly, we do find some evidence of differentiation of allocation of resources in the case 
of the widows’ sample. The results presented in Table A9 show that widowhood implies 
lower spending on educational books if the first born child is a girl by a substantial 51% 
compared to the situation of the first born being a boy. There is also evidence on differential 
total spending on children among widows conditional on gender with total child related 
spending being as much as 25% higher when the first born child is a boy. This effect, 
however, is only significant at 10% level. These results do not hold quantitatively if we 
consider the sample of widows alone. The coefficients have identical signs, however, they are 
insignificant. Like in columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 we attribute this to small sample size and 
the resulting lack of precision of estimation. 
   Table 6. First child gender and child related expenditures 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES  Total  Clothing  Toys  Books  Trips  Kidergarden  Education 
All families (excluding widows) 
Mean expend. Girls  134.818  61.75149  18.86881  20.10114  6.661954  26.45739  0.9771741 
Mean expend. Boys  132.6612  57.64827  21.07968  19.5528  6.174718  27.34439  0.8613218 
Different  No  Yes (1%)  Yes (1%)  No  No  No  No 
% of HH with + expenditures  84.11  66.87  39.02  35.86  7.84  13.57  0.99 
First child a girl  1.12990  3.74568***  -2.29064***  0.24703  0.30096  -0.95101  0.07789 
 
(1.663)  (0.868)  (0.536)  (0.596)  (0.442)  (0.813)  (0.128) 
First boy baseline  133.1578  57.82118  21.11826  19.69852  6.264802  27.37534  0.8796824 
Percent effect  0.9  6.5  -10.8  1.3  4.8  -3.5  8.9 
Observations  41,811  41,811  41,811  41,811  41,811  41,811  41,811 
R-squared  0.126  0.055  0.048  0.067  0.035  0.075  0.012 
Married couples 
Mean expend. Girls  139.2753  63.8586  19.97326  20.52861  6.593698  27.32698  0.9941668 
Mean expend. Boys  135.8504  58.89901  21.85317  19.96726  6.07534  28.15987  0.8957928 
Different  Yes (10%)  Yes (1%)  Yes (1%)  No  No  No  No 
% of HH with + expenditures  85.04  67.85  40.07  36.46  7.94  13.92  1.03 
First child a girl  1.73795  4.30225***  -2.05264***  0.14701  0.31309  -1.02722  0.05545 
  (1.785)  (0.935)  (0.584)  (0.638)  (0.467)  (0.873)  (0.137) 
First boy baseline  136.6628  59.21557  21.93635  20.16679  6.174191  28.25345  0.9164624 
Percent effect  1.3  7.3  -9.4  0.7  5.1  -3.6  6.1 
Observations  37,321  37,321  37,321  37,321  37,321  37,321  37,321 
R-squared  0.131  0.056  0.050  0.069  0.035  0.079  0.013 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged between 0 and 12; mothers aged <41; samples restricted to 
households with only one family with dependent children. 
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009.The differential consumption patterns by the gender of the first child can be identified also 
when we split the sample by the age of the oldest child (Table A10). Our estimates show that 
the higher spending on children’s clothing in the case of having a first born girl is almost the 
same for families with the oldest child aged 0-6 and 7-12 (percent effect 5.6% and 7.3% 
respectively), but the effect on toys grows strongly with the age of the oldest child from 
negative 6.9% in the younger group to negative 16.4% among those aged 7-12. 
5.   Effects of child’s gender by education group and cohort 
To summarize the results of the previous two sections we can say that there is evidence in the 
Polish data of the effect of child’s gender on several important outcomes. These include 
partnership stability in which we find evidence of positive effects of boys on the likelihood of 
parents living together, and evidence of a negative effect on the probability of having more 
than one child following a first born girl among married couples. Gender of the first child is 
not correlated with mother’s labor market outcomes but it does determine the pattern of child-
related consumption – while parents spend more on girls’ clothing, boys are more likely to get 
toys. 
In this section we examine if the gender effects differ across mothers’ highest education status 
and birth cohorts. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8 respectively and in each case we 
distinguish three sub-samples. A note of caution is needed here concerning the education 
classification as in some cases mothers may still be in full-time (or part-time) education. As 
far as the cohort sub-samples are concerned one has to bear in mind that in these cases the 
estimated effects result both from different maternal cohorts and form the age of children 
related to these cohorts. This is to some extent mitigated by the long span of the data we use, 
but it by no means solves the problem entirely as we only use data for seven years. 
The tables examine the main variables used in the analysis – whether there are two or more 
children in the family (“2 or more kids”), if the father does not live together with the mother 
and children (“No dad”), if the mother is separated or divorced (“Mother sep/div”), if she 
works (“Work mom”), the level of her work income (“Income mom”), total child-related 
consumption (“Total cons.”),  expenditure on children’s clothes (“Clothing cons.”), 
expenditure on toys and games (“Toys cons”) and on educational books (“Books cons.”). 
   Table 7. Heterogeneity in the effect of first child’s gender by mother’s education 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
VARIABLES  2 or more kids  No dad  Mother sep/div  Work mom  Income mom   Total child cons.  Clothing cons.  Toys cons.  Books cons. 
Above secondary 
First child a girl  -0.01877**  -0.00265  -0.00270  -0.00592  -32.99472  4.14571  5.58299***  -3.82337***  1.59906 
  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (22.764)  (4.172)  (2.054)  (1.434)  (1.040) 
First boy baseline  -  0.0946796  0.0499261  0.7792806  1321.4  191.4265  76.49856  35.29595  17.3604 
Percent effect  -  -2.8  -5.4  -0.8  -2.5  2.2  7.3  -10.8  9.2 
Observations  11,940  11,940  11,378  11,940  11,940  11,410  11,410  11,410  11,410 
R-squared  0.224  0.029  0.030  0.088  0.175  0.121  0.048  0.035  0.090 
Secondary 
First child a girl  -0.01261*  0.01334***  0.00040  -0.00617  -5.40172  2.19809  4.30849***  -1.56456*  0.13310 
  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (11.615)  (2.549)  (1.395)  (0.813)  (0.942) 
First boy baseline  -  0.1292317  0.0610431  0.587353  539.5085  128.9251  56.94562  19.54086  19.21891 
Percent effect  -  10.3  0.7  -1.1  -1.0  1.7  7.6  -8.0  0.7 
Observations  16,691  16,691  15,367  16,691  16,691  15,319  15,319  15,319  15,319 
R-squared  0.256  0.061  0.028  0.089  0.112  0.079  0.033  0.019  0.072 
Below secondary 
First child a girl  -0.00326  0.01049*  0.00600  0.01202*  -0.22937  -2.78714  1.65576  -1.92066***  -0.75253 
  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (6.883)  (2.081)  (1.167)  (0.589)  (1.089) 
First boy baseline  -  0.1699433  0.0615586  0.4532117  253.7422  93.62782  44.6345  12.02836  21.9924 
Percent effect  -  6.2  9.7  2.7  -0.1  -3.0  3.7  -16.0  -3.4 
Observations  16,880  16,880  14,880  16,880  16,880  15,082  15,082  15,082  15,082 
R-squared  0.266  0.131  0.033  0.101  0.084  0.061  0.037  0.021  0.056 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged between 0 and 12; mothers aged <41; in case of consumption 
outcomes (columns 6-9) samples restricted to households with only one family with dependent children.. In column (3) sample conditional on mother ever being married. 
“Total child cons” – the sum of child related consumption (child clothing, toys, books, kindergarten, trips and education.). Within broad education categories additional 
education indicators are included.  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009.The estimations show notable patterns both by education levels and by mothers’ cohort. First 
of all the effect of a first born girl on the probability of having two or more children (column 
1 in Tables 7 and 8) are present only for the better educated mothers and for the older 
mothers, although the signs are also negative for mothers with less than secondary education 
and those born after 1980. Gender of the first child seems to affect marital stability only for 
mothers with secondary education or lower, however there is no pattern by cohort. The effects 
among youngest and oldest mothers are very similar and we do not find any significant effects 
among those born between 1971 and 1980. From this point of view it might thus be surprising 
that the effect of child gender on child-related spending is almost as strong among the highest 
educated and those with secondary education. It is only as it comes to expenditure on toys that 
the pattern is strongest among the lowest educated families compared to the better educated. 
Interestingly, the expenditure pattern differs significantly by mothers’ cohort, although in this 
case the effect of child’s age and potentially of mothers’ better financial status due to her age 
might also play a role. The percentage effect of gender of the first born child on spending on 
clothing is almost three times larger among families with mothers born before 1971 compared 
to those born between 1971 and 1980. The effect on toys spending is over 6 percentage points 
higher, and both effects are weakest among the youngest cohorts of mother. 
These differentiated effects on consumption patterns may be reflections of different 
underlying processes. On the one hand, these may be cohort effects showing changes in 
parental attitudes towards expenditure patterns by gender of children. Secondly, they may 
reflect the increasing gender differentiation of expenditures with children’s age which could 
suggest increasing influence of “gender roles” as children get older. It could also be a 
reflection of consumption driven by children’s preferences as they get older and play an 
increasing role in determining expenditure patterns. We must remember however, that our 
sample includes only children aged at most 12 years old, and so perhaps such strong influence 
of children’ age would be unlikely, in which case the dominant effect would be that of 
changing consumption patterns by cohort which seem to be getting more balanced with time. 
   Table 8. Heterogeneity in the impact of first child gender by mother’s cohort 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
VARIABLES  2 or more kids  No dad  Mother sep/div  Work mom  Income mom   Total cons.  Clothing cons.  Toys cons.  Books cons. 
Born before 1971 
First child a girl  -0.02549**  0.01822**  0.00908  -0.01267  -41.96006*  3.04268  8.73359***  -3.36146**  -2.96151 
  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (23.672)  (5.190)  (2.557)  (1.560)  (2.000) 
First boy baseline  -  0.0894217  0.0628092  0.7283765  901.3299  158.6138  62.30407  19.87473  34.12141 
Percent effect  -  20.4  14.5  -1.7  -4.7  1.9  14.0  -16.9  -8.7 
Observations  6,041  6,041  5,839  6,041  6,041  5,951  5,951  5,951  5,951 
R-squared  0.159  0.033  0.024  0.113  0.328  0.118  0.052  0.058  0.040 
Born between 1971 and 1980 
First child a girl  -0.00901*  0.00246  -0.00089  0.00495  -11.13796  1.34927  2.87792***  -2.26088***  0.73169 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (9.678)  (2.017)  (1.060)  (0.631)  (0.737) 
First boy baseline  -  0.1127376  0.061504  0.6179221  679.1063  137.7293  60.23551  21.23145  20.19941 
Percent effect  -  2.2  -1.5  0.8  -1.6  1.0  4.8  -10.6  3.6 
Observations  30,380  30,380  28,670  30,380  30,380  28,794  28,794  28,794  28,794 
R-squared  0.236  0.044  0.031  0.109  0.280  0.122  0.053  0.051  0.062 
Born after 1980 
First child a girl  -0.00267  0.02083**  0.00299  -0.00324  23.37431  0.53423  3.38689*  -1.25479  0.90599 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (16.256)  (3.187)  (1.804)  (1.304)  (0.802) 
First boy baseline  -  0.2405591  0.0420124  0.3937347  323.3754  92.1451  43.99809  21.59624  5.583789 
Percent effect  -  8.7  7.1  -0.8  7.2  0.6  7.7  -5.8  16.2 
Observations  9,090  9,090  7,116  9,090  9,090  7,066  7,066  7,066  7,066 
R-squared  0.258  0.128  0.034  0.103  0.129  0.117  0.049  0.038  0.061 
Notes: see notes for Table 7.  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009.6.  Conclusions 
We have demonstrated in this paper that child gender affects many important outcomes of 
Polish parents and children. Looking at the relationship between gender of the first born child 
and family outcomes such as marital stability and fertility, we found evidence for statistically 
significant effects in both cases. Since gender of the first born child can be treated as 
exogenous these effects can be given a causal interpretation. Taking the collective model 
(Chiappori, 1992) as the theoretical background for the analysis, we argued, however, that 
making the link from the identified relationships to parental preferences is far from 
straightforward. While negative relationship between the first born girl and partnership 
stability, which we find in the Polish data, has been usually given the interpretation of 
parental “boy preferences”, we argued that numerous preference-related interpretations of this 
finding are possible, and they rely on further assumptions, such as for example, that the 
gender of the first child does not affect the relative bargaining power of the parents. The fact 
that a first born girl reduces partnership stability can be reconciled with boy preferences of 
both parents, or of one of them only, as well as with opposite gender preferences of the 
parents. If we are prepared to assume that the minimum required utility level among men to 
remain in the relationship is lower than among women, then conditional on the relative 
bargaining power of partners, men’s boy preferences on their own may result in partnership 
break-up.  
The degree of an influence of first child’s gender on partnership stability is quite astonishing. 
We find it to be much higher than comparable estimates for the US. We find that girls are 
substantially more likely to live without a father, in families where mother was never married 
or in dissolved families. Additionally, mothers of first born girls are less likely to get married. 
Effects of gender on marital stability are only significant among parents with secondary or 
lower education and there is no evidence for any clear time-related pattern.  
We find that among married couples the probability of having the second child is strongly 
affected by gender of the first child, and that at higher parities fertility patterns reflect a desire 
for mixed gender of children. Correcting for the possible influence of sample selection on 
observed fertility patterns we show that these findings are not inconsistent with the negative 
relationship of the first born girl  with marital stability. Additionally, once again with 
reference to the collective model, we argue that the fertility outcomes we find may be 
consistent with preferences for girls of either of the parents, but also that they could be in line 29 
 
with gender preferences for boys among fathers. This would be the case if following a first 
born girl mothers preferred not to have the second child to avoid divorce in case it also turned 
out to be a girl (and the utility level of the father was further reduced as a result, see the 
discussion in the Appendix for details). 
Our results show also that that in Poland women, whose first born child is a girl, do not 
experience any negative labor market consequences in comparison to women with first born 
boys. Unlike in advanced economies, we reject both the indirect effect operating through 
marital stability and the direct effect studied using subsamples of population in which fertility 
and marital stability are unlikely to explain the observed labor market outcomes. Finally, we 
add to the recent literature the analysis of “gender preferences”  manifested  in household 
consumption. On the one hand, when we consider total child-related expenditure in these 
analyses, we do not find any support for any gender bias. On the other hand, we do reveal 
traditional gender roles perception of Polish parents. A first born girl increases expenditures 
on child clothing, while a first born boy increases expenditures on toys.  
Clearly, as with other studies in this literature there is ample room for different interpretation 
of our results, in particular if one takes the individual approach to parental preferences. It is 
very interesting though to note the distinct pattern of results found for Poland in this paper, as 
it is different both from advanced economies and from developing countries. The results are 
also important from the point of view of socio-economic policy in Poland, and potentially also 
in other countries. We found a very high degree of the effect of children’s gender on marital 
stability, and strong differential patterns of child-related expenditure. Marital stability has 
been demonstrated to have significant negative consequences on a number of child outcomes 
(Demo and Acock, 1988; Seltzer, 1994; Amato, 2000). Differential expenditure patterns may 
act to put girls (or boys) at a disadvantage later in life. Since both of these channels may 
reflect preference for children of a specific gender, our results suggest that the outcomes could 
be affected by changes in the approach to gender issues and more gender equality, and as such 
support the important role of policies focusing on gender equality.  30 
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Interpreting gender preferences in the framework of the collective model 
Below we describe a simple framework within which one can interpret our results. In the 
literature so far (e.g. Dahl and Moretti, 2008) the interpretation of “preferences” has not been 
well specified, in that parents’ preferences were treated jointly. In this type of framework it is 
then difficult to discuss the issues of fertility and separation decisions, and – as generally in 
the unitary approach - it is unclear whose preferences one is identifying. In our approach we 
draw on the collective model (Chiappori, 1992) and allow each of the parents to have their 
own preferences concerning consumption goods and children – including child’s gender. In 
the discussion below we present a simple application of the collective model and demonstrate 
under what conditions we can give clearest interpretation of our results.  
First – borrowing the notation from Dahl and Moretti (2008), let’s assume that parents have 
the following utility function: 
  ,, , ,, ( , , , ,) ( , , ,)
i
j t t jt jt j jt jt jt UB GX Z i UK X Z i =   (1) 
where 
  , , ,, , , , , (,,) ( ) ( , )
i ii ki i c i i
ij jt jt jt ij j t j t ij j jt j jt UKXZ B G X Z αβ µν =Π + +Π   (2) 
where  , j mf = for male and female, and  , i MD = for married or divorced.  ,
k
ij Π is a subutility 
function deriving from having children, while  ,
c
ij Π is a subutility function deriving from 
personal consumption of goods X and Z, and the subutilities are additively separable. B stands 
for boys and G stands for girls and as we can see valuations of boys and girls may vary over j, 
i.e. men and women may have a preference for either gender. Valuations of boys and girls 
may also vary over state (married or divorce), while valuation of consumption is independent 
of marital state. 
The principal assumption of the collective model is that marriage is defined as a state where 
individuals generate a Pareto efficient allocation of resources (Chiappori, 1992). This means 
that for any level of utility of one partner, the other will be allowed to allocate resources in 34 
 
such a way so that the combination of utility outcomes of both partners is Pareto efficient. 
Taking the couple’s budget constraint to be: 
  t t t tt pB qG rX sZ Y +++=   (3) 
we can define the maximization problem of the women at each point of the utility space of the 
man to be to maximize her utility:  , , ,, (,,)
M MM
Mf ft ft ft U KXZ, subject to the following conditions: 
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where ϖ defines a particular point in the utility space of the man which can be achieved in the 
married state. This is illustrated in Figure A1. The solution final of the optimization problem 
will eventually depend on the bargaining power of the partners represented by the slope of the 
function “b” (the steeper it is the higher is the bargaining power of the man), and whether a 
marriage continues or not will be a function of the minimum level of utility each of the 
partners is willing to accept (referred to as the “divorce threshold”, respectively Um,min and Uf, 
min). 
Figure A1. Male and Female utility in the collective model. 
 




                       
                                                              
Uf,min 
                                                                        b 
                                                       PF   
 
                     Um,min          Um*       Um,max      Um    
 
Now let us consider the optimization process over three periods of time, t1, t2, and t3. At the 
beginning of t1 the couple knows their budget constraint, and knows that in each of the period 
they can have one child, a boy or a girl (with known probabilities). The children are born at 
the end of t1 and possibly also t2, and for simplicity we assume that all couples will have a 
child in t1. Since the gender of the children is not known before they are born, the parents 
make their fertility plans (i.e. whether to have just one child or two) initially on the basis of 35 
 
expected utilities over the two births at the beginning of t1, and then with known gender of the 
first child, but unknown gender of the second at the beginning of t2. At the end of t1 and at the 
end of t2 the couple may decide to get divorced (we assume the possibility of unilateral 
divorce). Thus, given that we assume that all couples will have a child in period t1, the final 
fertility decision is taken at the beginning of t2 with known gender of the first child.  
For simplicity let us only consider the maximization problem over periods t1  and  t2, i.e. 
without regard to the utility in t3 (in which the couple may be divorced or married, but in 
which no further fertility choices are made). First, let us consider what happens at the end of 
period t1. This is illustrated in Figure A2 for two different preference assumptions, where we 
show  what happens to the couple’s two-period opportunity set (bounded by the Pareto 
frontiers), once the gender of the first child is revealed. If either of the parents have non-
neutral gender preferences, then the couple’s two-period opportunity set will change once the 
gender of each child is revealed. This is illustrated for a scenario where women have gender 
neutral preferences, and men have boy preferences (Figure A2.A), and for a scenario where 
women have girl preferences and men have boy preferences (Figure A2.B). 
Figure A2. Gender preferences and opportunity sets in the collective model 
A. Men: boy preferences, women: neutral  B. Men: boy preferences, women: girl preferences 
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Notes: PF1 – expected Pareto frontier before birth (and under gender neutrality of both parents); PF2 – Pareto frontier if a 
boy is born; PF3 – Pareto frontier if a girl is born; b1, b2, b3 – functions representing relative bargaining power of 
partners. 
In each case of non-neutral preferences the opportunity set after the first birth changes 
depending on the  preferences of each partner. This “t1 revealed”  opportunity set is the 
opportunity set under continued uncertainty of the gender of the potential second child. 
Whether the couple decides to have the second child will depend on the overall preferences 36 
 
and the relative bargaining power, i.e. on the solution at the tangency of PF2 and b2 or PF3 
and b3. Note that since the couple re-optimizes at the end of t1 the fertility decision at the 
beginning of t2 may be different from that in the original fertility plan at the beginning of t1. 
Of course once the gender of the first child is known parents also re-optimize with respect to 
the consumption of X and Z (since prices of boys and girls may be different). Importantly, if 
the outcome falls below the “divorce threshold” of any of the partners then divorce will be the 
consequence at the end of period t1, and the couple will not have the second child.
16
The model illustrates that in each of the scenarios, men’s boy preferences imply lower utility 
once the first born is a girl, and if the outcome is such that the utility level falls below men’s 
“divorce threshold” they will get divorced (or not get married). However, since the same 
holds in the case of women’s preferences (i.e. if women have boy preferences then once again 
divorce probability will be higher if the first born is a girl), the sole observation that living in 
a couple is less likely if the first born was a girl, does not lead to any conclusions concerning 
preferences of either of the partner. In fact boy preferences of both parents will also imply 
lower utility (and thus higher probability of break up) if the first born is a girl. Until now the 
model therefore only suggests that whenever there are preferences for a specific gender of one 
or of both partners, divorce will be more likely if the first born is of the other gender. This 
will be particularly the case if partners have opposing gender preferences.  
  
In order to draw more specific conclusions and to be able to point to specific preferences an 
additional condition is necessary. We refer to this condition as “divorce dominance”. The 
“divorce dominant” partner is the partner whose divorce utility threshold is - in relative terms 
to the maximum utility in marriage - higher. In the case of male “divorce dominance” if 
observed outcomes show higher probability of divorce if first born is a girl, then the model 
rules out the following: 
o  both men and women are gender neutral; 
o  both men and women have preferences for girls; 
o  men have preferences for girls and women are preference neutral or have 
preferences for boys (opposite of scenario 2 or 3); 
Therefore with a “divorce dominant” partner (men) higher divorce after first born girl is 
consistent with men’s preferences for boys. Assuming “divorce dominance” allows to assign 
                                                           
16 Note that we assume here that the bargaining power does not depend on the gender of the first child. 37 
 
gender preferences to the divorce dominant partner (men have preferences for boys). 
However, the approach still does not allow us to identify preferences of the other partner. 
Fertility decisions in period t2: 
Now let us consider what happens at the beginning of period t2. The partners now know the 
gender of the first child, and so know their “t1 revealed” opportunity set. Let’s consider two 
situations in which the gender of the first child is a boy or a girl, and let’s analyze what 
decision the couple might take using the scenario in which men have boy preferences and 
women are gender neutral. The current solution to the couple’s choice (with continued 
uncertainty over the gender of the potential second child) lies on the Pareto frontier PF2 if the 
first born was a boy or on PF3 if the first born was a girl. The couple now decides on whether 
to have the second child, and this is determined by their location on the respective Pareto 
frontiers. Without knowing specific preference parameters it is difficult to determine the final 
fertility choice. Note that in this set-up, if they decide to have the second child and if this is 
consistent with their t1 fertility plan, and if the couple have boy following a girl, or a girl 
following a boy the final outcome will be located on the initial expected PF (assuming that 
they do not have preferences over the sequence).  
If we are willing to continue to assume “divorce dominance” of men, then in the scenario in 
which the couple have a first born girl (A3.B), the solution will depend also on whether the 
second girl might shift the opportunity set in such a way as to imply a utility level for the man 
that would be below his divorce threshold. If that is the case women may be unwilling to take 
the risk to have the second child following a girl, but may be willing to have the second child 
if the first is a boy. On top of that, if men are gender neutral and women have preferences for 
girls, a first born girl might reduce the willingness to have the second child. The above 
implies that an observed lower probability of the second child following a first born girl 
would be consistent not only with girl preferences (of either parents) but also with boy 
preferences of men if we are willing to assume male “divorce dominance”. 38 
 
Figure A3. First-born boy and fertility choices in t2  
A. Men: boy preferences, women: neutral, first 
born boy 
B. Men: boy preferences, women: neutral, 
first born girl 
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Notes: PF1 – expected Pareto frontier before birth (and under gender neutrality of both parents); PF2 – Pareto frontier if 
a boy is born; PF3 – Pareto frontier if a girl is born; b1, b2, b3 – functions representing relative bargaining power of 
partners. 
 Regressions 
Table A1. First child gender and the family status. Additional estimates 1. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Living without father  Mother never married  Mother separated or divorced 
First child a girl 
First child a girl  0.00819***  0.00719***  0.00141 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
First boy baseline  0.1351928  0.0817785  0.0582502 
Percent effect  6.1  8.8  2.4 
Observations  45,511  45,511  41,625 
R-squared  0.087  0.123  0.027 
First two children of the same sex 
First child a girl  0.00796  0.00120  0.00669 
  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two children boys  0.00058  -0.00460  0.00505 
  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two children girls  -0.00045  0.00144  -0.00156 
  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two boys baseline  0.0772957  0.0314569  0.0472665 
Percent effect  -0.6  4.6  -3.3 
R-squared  0.067  0.082  0.027 
First two children of the same sex without controlling for first child gender 
First two children boys  -0.00336  -0.00519**  0.00174 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
First two children girls  0.00358  0.00204  0.00183 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two boys baseline  0.0763409  0.0313133  0.0464637 
Percent effect  4.7  6.5  3.9 
R-squared  0.067  0.082  0.027 
First two children of different sex 
First child a girl  0.00744**  0.00422*  0.00339 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Second child a girl  -0.00051  0.00302  -0.00331 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
First two children mix sex  -0.00007  0.00158  -0.00174 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
First two children same sex baseline  0.0772218  0.0310208  0.0477509 
Percent effect  -0.08  5.1  -3.7 
R-squared  0.067  0.082  0.027 
Observations  21,920  21,920  21,217 
First child a girl. Sample restricted to oldest child being between 5 and 12. 
First child a girl  0.00686*  0.00580**  0.00138 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
First boy baseline  0.1191642  0.0493855  0.0735102 
Percent effect  5.8  11.7  1.9 
Observations  27,970  27,970  26,504 
R-squared  0.055  0.056  0.026 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged 
between 0 and 12 or 5-12 if specified; mothers aged <41;  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. Table A2. First child gender and the family status. Additional estimates 2. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Living without father  Mother never 
married 
Mother separated or divorced 
First two children of the same sex 
First child a girl  0.00840**  0.00216  0.00635* 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two children boys  0.00282  -0.00262  0.00534 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
First two children girls  0.00837*  0.00108  0.00775** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two boys baseline  0.078553  0.0265188  0.0534267 
Percent effect  10.7  4.1  14.5 
R-squared  0.059  0.073  0.030 
First two children of the same sex without controlling for first child gender 
First two children boys  -0.00135  -0.00369*  0.00219 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
First two children girls  0.01260***  0.00217  0.01096*** 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
First two boys baseline  0.07754  0.0262579  0.0526605 
Percent effect  16.3  8.3  20.8 
R-squared  0.059  0.073  0.030 
First two children of different sex 
First child a girl  0.01117***  0.00401**  0.00755*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Second child a girl  0.00278  0.00185  0.00120 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
First two children mix sex  -0.00560*  0.00077  -0.00655** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
First two children same sex baseline  0.0832971  0.0264008  0.0584809 
Percent effect  -6.7  2.9  -11.2 
R-squared  0.059  0.073  0.030 
Observations  30,922  30,922  30,084 
First child a girl. Sample restricted to oldest child being between 5 and 15. 
First child a girl  0.01065***  0.00513**  0.00614** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
First boy baseline  0.114873  0.0417374  0.0763702 
Percent effect  9.3  12.3  8.0 
Observations  39,037  39,037  37,300 
R-squared  0.052  0.054  0.027 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged 
between 0 and 15 or 5-15 if specified; mothers aged <41;  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 41 
 
Table A3. First child gender and the family status. Additional estimates 3. 
probability of the mother being married by age of children 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  0-15  0-12  5-15  5-12 
First child a girl 
First child a girl  -0.01241***  -0.00971***  -0.01277***  -0.00830** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First boy baseline  0.8631271  0.856336  0.8786557  0.8736338 
Percent effect  -1.4  -1.1  -1.5  -1.0 
Observations  56,578  45,511  39,037  27,970 
R-squared  0.081  0.087  0.055  0.057 
First two children of the same sex 
First child a girl  -0.01048**  -0.00898*  -0.00900*  -0.00642 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
First two children boys  -0.00179  0.00023  -0.00136  0.00127 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
First two children girls  -0.00719  0.00091  -0.00845*  0.00089 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
First two boys baseline  0.9150187  0.91639  0.916241  0.9183979 
Percent effect  -0.8  0.1  -0.9  0.1 
Observations  30,922  21,920  27,419  18,417 
R-squared  0.063  0.071  0.055  0.058 
First two children of the same sex without controlling for first child gender 
First two children boys  0.00342  0.00467  0.00312  0.00445 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
First two children girls  -0.01247***  -0.00363  -0.01298***  -0.00236 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
First two boys baseline  0.9162837  0.9174675  0.9173252  0.9191652 
Percent effect  -1.4  -0.4  -1.4  -0.3 
Observations  30,922  21,920  27,419  18,417 
R-squared  0.063  0.070  0.055  0.058 
First two children of different sex 
First child a girl  -0.01318***  -0.00864**  -0.01254***  -0.00661* 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Second child a girl  -0.00270  0.00034  -0.00354  -0.00019 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two children mix sex  0.00449  -0.00057  0.00490  -0.00108 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
First two children same sex baseline  0.9111004  0.9168857  0.9118159  0.9191393 
Percent effect  0.5  -0.06  0.5  -0.1 
Observations  30,922  21,920  27,419  18,417 
R-squared  0.063  0.071  0.055  0.058 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged 
between 0 and 15; mothers aged <41;  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 42 
 
Table A4. Effects of first child’s gender on fertility. Additional estimates 1. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  All  Married  Marriage control  Marriage interaction 
Total number of children 
First child a girl  -0.00706  -0.00321  -0.00467  -0.01707 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.015) 
Married mother      0.24599***  0.23879*** 
      (0.009)  (0.012) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.01456 
        (0.016) 
Observations  45,511  38,759  45,511  45,511 
R-squared  0.276  0.285  0.288  0.288 
Probability of having two or more children 
First child a girl  -0.01115***  -0.01237***  -0.00923**  0.00516 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
Married mother      0.19733***  0.20569*** 
      (0.006)  (0.008) 
First child a girl * Married mother        -0.01690 
        (0.011) 
Observations  45,511  38,759  45,511  45,511 
R-squared  0.265  0.274  0.283  0.283 
Probability of having three or more children 
First child a girl  0.00213  0.00491  0.00255  -0.01163** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Married mother      0.04322***  0.03500*** 
      (0.003)  (0.005) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.01664*** 
        (0.006) 
Observations  45,511  38,759  45,511  45,511 
R-squared  0.124  0.127  0.126  0.127 
Probability of having four or more children 
First child a girl  0.00084  0.00199  0.00089  -0.00528* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Married mother      0.00491***  0.00133 
      (0.002)  (0.003) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.00724** 
        (0.003) 
Observations  45,511  38,759  45,511  45,511 
R-squared  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047 
Probability of having five or more children 
First child a girl  0.00035  0.00097  0.00034  -0.00321* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Married mother      -0.00035  -0.00241 
      (0.001)  (0.002) 
First child a girl * Married mother        0.00417** 
        (0.002) 
Observations  45,511  38,759  45,511  45,511 
R-squared  0.020  0.019  0.020  0.021 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged 
between 0 and 12; mothers aged <41;  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 43 
 
Table A5. Probability of two or more children under alternative assumptions of 
preferences of separated parents 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
  All separated parents have 
boy preferences 
All separated 
parents have girl 
preferences 
Separated parents 
have wither boy or 
girl preferences 
First child a girl  0.05459***  -0.07416***  -0.01036** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
First boy baseline  0.4868408  0.550311  0.5510518 
Percent effect  11.2  -13.5  -1.9 
Observations  45,511  45,511  45,511 
R-squared  0.233  0.232  0.209 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Families with children living at 
home aged between 0 and 12; mothers aged <41.  
Imputations of children for separated families adjusted for the probability of having more than one child  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 44 
 
Table A6. Effects of first child’s gender on fertility. Additional estimates 3. 
Effect of first two children’s gender 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  0-15  0-12 
VARIABLES  All  Married  All  Married 
Total number of children 
First child a girl  0.02526**  0.03114***  0.01997*  0.02860** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
First two children girls  0.03327***  0.03681***  0.02057*  0.02163* 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
First two children boys  0.06180***  0.06658***  0.03402***  0.03600*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Observations  30,922  28,241  21,920  20,092 
R-squared  0.129  0.128  0.116  0.113 
Probability of having three or more children 
First child a girl  0.01277*  0.01230*  0.01446*  0.01668** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
First two children girls  0.02970***  0.03462***  0.02037***  0.02393*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
First two children boys  0.03830***  0.03692***  0.03235***  0.03167*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Observations  30,922  28,241  21,920  20,092 
R-squared  0.121  0.120  0.106  0.104 
Probability of having four or more children 
First child a girl  0.00226  0.00546  0.00038  0.00307 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
First two children girls  0.00969**  0.00900**  0.00376  0.00267 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
First two children boys  0.01032***  0.01241***  0.00007  0.00059 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Observations  30,922  28,241  21,920  20,092 
R-squared  0.068  0.068  0.056  0.054 
Probability of having five or more children 
First child a girl  0.00342  0.00490**  0.00258  0.00467** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
First two children girls  -0.00112  -0.00161  -0.00243  -0.00358 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
First two children boys  0.00636***  0.00825***  0.00097  0.00185 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Observations  30,922  28,241  21,920  20,092 
R-squared  0.035  0.034  0.028  0.025 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged 
between 0 and 15; mothers aged <41;  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 45 
 
Table A7. Effect of first child gender on mother’s labor supply. Additional estimates 1. 
Married couples. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  0-15  0-12  0-2 
Probability of working 
First child a girl  0.00156  -0.00251  0.00464 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
First boy baseline  0.6252534  0.6050175  0.4905834 
Percent effect  0.3  -0.4  0.9 
Observations  48,493  38,759  8,628 
R-squared  0.129  0.129  0.152 
Probability of working for pay 
First child a girl  0.00108  -0.00215  0.00482 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
First boy baseline  0.6094244  0.5898038  0.4724119 
Percent effect  0.2  -0.4  1.0 
Observations  48,493  38,759  8,628 
R-squared  0.126  0.127  0.152 
Monthly labor income 
First child a girl  -6.20816  -14.10777  -7.36586 
  (7.731)  (8.777)  (21.596) 
First boy baseline  659.8525  652.1509  567.2365 
Percent effect  -0.9  -2.2  -1.3 
Observations  48,493  38,759  8,628 
R-squared  0.270  0.268  0.211 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged 
between 0 and 15; mothers aged <41;  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 46 
 
Table A8. Effects of first child gender on mother’s labor supply. Additional estimates 2. 
Sample including widows. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Work  Work for pay  Income 
Children aged 0-15 
First child a girl  0.00511  0.00346  -4.01700 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (7.011) 
Widow  -0.02159  -0.06524**  -42.31012 
  (0.030)  (0.030)  (41.159) 
First child a girl * Widow  0.02346  -0.00675  -36.32359 
  (0.044)  (0.045)  (58.709) 
First boy baseline  0.6092534  0.5930273  650.3813 
Percent effect  0.8  0.6  -0.6 
Observations  57,028  57,028  57,028 
R-squared  0.142  0.139  0.278 
Children aged 0-12 
First child a girl  0.00078  -0.00007  -10.40359 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (7.896) 
Widow  -0.00444  -0.01979  -1.15037 
  (0.041)  (0.041)  (57.832) 
First child a girl * Widow  -0.03533  -0.08663  -91.04545 
  (0.059)  (0.059)  (78.210) 
First boy baseline  0.5879309  0.5726162  638.2284 
Percent effect  0.1  -0.01  -1.6 
Observations  45,777  45,777  45,777 
R-squared  0.143  0.142  0.276 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged 
between 0 and 15 or 0-12 as specified; mothers aged <41;  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009. 
 Table A9. First child gender and the expenditures and consumption. Additional estimates 1. Sample including widows. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES  Total  Clothing  Toys  Books  Trips  Kidergarden  Education 
All families 
Mean expend. girls  134.6513  61.71016  18.80984  20.09422  6.677403  26.38332  0.9763735 
Mean expend. boys  132.6884  57.63712  21.0069  19.66154  6.230878  27.29183  0.8601741 
Different  No  Yes (5%)  Yes (5%)  No  No  No  No 
% of HH with + expenditures  84.11  66.87  38.95  35.95  7.85  13.56  0.99 
First child a girl  0.91789  3.70565***  -2.28150***  0.13307  0.26110  -0.97971  0.07927 
  (1.658)  (0.865)  (0.533)  (0.595)  (0.442)  (0.809)  (0.127) 
First boy baseline  133.1939  57.81484  21.04775  19.80647  6.320573  27.32627  0.8780361 
Percent effect  0.7  6.4  -10.8  0.7  4.1  -3.6  9.0 
Observations  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046 
R-squared  0.125  0.054  0.048  0.067  0.035  0.074  0.012 
Widows 
Mean expend. girls  106.3377  54.68773  8.790672  18.91832  9.302353  13.79832  0.8403361 
Mean expend. boys  137.762  55.56121  7.460517  39.90034  16.68388  17.50948  0.6465517 
Different  No  No  No  Yes (5%)  No  No  No 
% of HH with + expenditures  84.26  67.66  25.11  51.91  9.79  11.49  0.85 
First child a girl  -16.52953  -1.43187  0.46790  -14.52827  0.11968  -1.43456  0.27759 
  (20.014)  (10.002)  (3.657)  (9.485)  (7.516)  (6.670)  (1.258) 
First boy baseline  130.2196  55.84397  7.897149  36.63227  12.8854  16.35665  0.6041123 
Percent effect  -12.7  -2.6  5.9  -39.7  0.9  -8.8  46.0 
Observations  235  235  235  235  235  235  235 
R-squared  0.234  0.182  0.152  0.194  0.196  0.265  0.228 
All families interaction 
First child a girl  1.13167  3.74516***  -2.29007***  0.24931  0.29996  -0.95101  0.07832 
  (1.663)  (0.868)  (0.536)  (0.596)  (0.442)  (0.813)  (0.128) 
Widow  -2.83971  -4.23685  -9.11452***  10.06045  6.08693  -4.64230  -0.99343 
  (17.285)  (6.815)  (1.889)  (9.101)  (7.636)  (5.406)  (0.668) 
First child a girl*Widow  -36.39786*  -6.42472  2.20888  -20.73247**  -7.15272  -4.54032  0.24349 
  (20.567)  (9.009)  (3.219)  (10.153)  (8.846)  (6.894)  (1.074) 
First boy baseline (girl)  133.1935  57.81391  21.04564  19.80892  6.322019  27.32524  0.8778065 
Percent effect (girl)  0.7  6.4  -10.8  0.7  4.1  -3.6  9.1 
First boy baseline (interaction)  140.2805  58.37226  7.015545  39.77397  16.56801  17.92936  0.6213838 
Percent effect (interaction)  -25.9  -11.0  31.5  -52.1  -43.2  -25.3  39.2 
R-squared  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046  42,046 
Observations  0.126  0.054  0.048  0.067  0.036  0.075  0.012 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged between 0 and 12; mothers aged <41; samples restricted to households with 
only one family with dependent children..  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009.Table A10. First child gender and the expenditures and consumption. Additional estimates 2. By age group of oldest child. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES  Total  Clothing  Toys  Books  Trips  Kidergarden  Education 
Oldest child 0 – 6 
Mean expend. Girls  120.3771  54.20884  22.91887  4.605613  .5411371  38.07466  0.02794 
Mean expend. Boys  119.2143  51.44412  24.52832  4.176368  .4844021  38.56091  0.020184 
Different  No  Yes (5%)  Yes (5%)  No  No  No  No 
% of HH with + expenditures  80.75  66.22  46.30  12.09  1.09  18.25  0.04 
First child a girl  1.96468  2.81503***  -1.69248**  0.53567*  0.06165  0.24115  0.00366 
  (2.132)  (1.090)  (0.785)  (0.301)  (0.189)  (1.311)  (0.024) 
First boy baseline 
118.8306  51.42005  24.56805  4.125449  .4820501  38.21288  0.0221426 
Percent effect  1.7  5.6  -6.9  13.0  12.8  0.6  16.5 
Observations  21,469  21,469  21,469  21,469  21,469  21,469  21,469 
R-squared  0.189  0.066  0.053  0.030  0.003  0.166  0.004 
Oldest child 7 – 12 
Mean expend. Girls  149.7292  69.53979  14.68684  36.10135  12.98212  14.46175  1.957324 
Mean expend. Boys  147.1469  64.33174  17.3646  36.11716  12.30465  15.26133  1.767443 
Different  No  Yes (1%)  Yes (1%)  No  No  No  No 
% of HH with + expenditures  87.65  67.56  31.34  60.95  14.96  8.62  1.99 
First child a girl  1.22095  4.69908***  -2.85777***  -0.26057  0.44972  -0.93943  0.12990 
  (2.542)  (1.365)  (0.725)  (1.176)  (0.878)  (0.797)  (0.262) 
First boy baseline  147.8126  64.58065  17.45263  36.23686  12.41603  15.32972  1.796774 
Percent effect  0.8  7.3  -16.4  -0.7  3.6  -6.1  7.2 
Observations  20,342  20,342  20,342  20,342  20,342  20,342  20,342 
R-squared  0.087  0.039  0.038  0.012  0.035  0.060  0.014 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Children living at home aged between 0 and 12; mothers aged <41; samples restricted to 
households with only one family with dependent children..  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey data, 2003-2009.